EU Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030: Europe invites Russia to postpone its invasion until 2030
Madrid, Spain – Europe is serious about increasing its defense capabilities, as was evident on October 15 with the presentation, by the European Commission, of the strategy for the next five years: Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 (in Spanish, Defense Preparedness Roadmap 2030). According to Ursula von der Leyen, Readiness Roadmap 2030 seeks to “strengthen European defense capabilities” and “strengthen Europe's ability to deter and defend itself on land, air, sea, cyberspace and space, directly contributing to NATO capabilities objectives.” An ambitious objective, taking into account the lagging and heterogeneous starting point of the different countries of the Union.
The plan includes initiatives to address countries' capabilities gaps in all areas encompassed by defense: air and missile defense; strategic enablers; military mobility; artillery systems; cyber, AI and electronic warfare; missiles and ammunition; drones and anti-drones; ground combat; and maritime field. It also contemplates four initial flagship projects of European preparedness, expandable in the future: the European Counter-Drone Defense Initiative, the Eastern Flank Surveillance, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield.
“European defense” as such has barely existed for many years. Beyond the border control of the European Union (EU), joint peace missions around the world or the article of the treaties - similar to that of NATO - that commits member countries to respond if one of them is attacked, there was little else. That is to say, the starting point is not particularly solid: neither at the regulatory and competency level, nor at the operational level, nor at the financial or investment level.
From a regulatory and competence point of view, the Commission's hands are tied: the Union Treaties are clear and establish that defense competence is exclusive to the Member States. Therefore, the EU can a) coordinate and propose, and b) focus on the economic aspect: competition, purchasing and manufacturing of defense material, areas in which it does have powers. That is precisely what Defence Readiness 2030 does: far from proposing a European army—of personnel or ammunition—it facilitates interoperability between armed forces, the deployment of joint investments and purchases (for example, with the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 plan) and supports the relocation of manufacturing and production in Europe. Aware of the sensitivity of jurisdiction, the document emphasizes several times that Member States are and will continue to be sovereign in their national defense and “responsible for their own armies.”
In operational terms, Coordination in the purchase and interoperability of defense systems between EU countries barely reaches 20%, and defense spending continues to be, as the Commission itself acknowledges, “overwhelmingly national and biased towards the local, leading to fragmentation, increase in cost and lack of interoperability.” One way to increase it is through joint purchases: the plan aims for 40% of defense procurement to be through joint contracts by the end of 2027 and that, by 2030, at least 60% of arms purchases come from EU or Ukrainian companies. In addition, the document details a “capability gap programme” focused on helping Member States meet their needs, recognizing that not all of them start from the same point or have the same capabilities. Beyond the compatibility of defense systems within the EU, interoperability with allies and structures such as NATO is also sought. A concern during the negotiation of this strategy was to avoid a parallel structure that overcomplicate the landscape; For this reason, the document emphasizes that technological development and purchases will be developed in coordination and "will be integrated, where appropriate, with NATO."
Financially, it is evident that Europe deprioritized defense investments for too many years, trusting in the protection and technological supremacy of its American ally. With Trump in the White House (or Golden House?), that assumption faded and Europe has had to get its act together: what the new Readiness 2030 promises is not cheap and requires money, a lot of money. The Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 estimates that the challenge is too great for the public sector alone to assume, so the majority of the investment will have to come from the private sector. The idea is to mobilize financing through public-private co-investment incentives, greater bureaucratic agility (for construction permits or exports) and facilities for lending and investing in defense. Specifically, the document indicates that the EU will help mobilize up to 800 billion euros for defense spending, including the SAFE – Security Action for Europe arms loan program for 150 billion, the European Defense Industry Program for 1.5 billion—still under negotiation—, the European Defense Fund and, once it is adopted in 2027, the bloc's next multiannual financial framework. Astronomical mobilization of money, taking into account that until yesterday there was not even a Defense Commissioner.
The first obstacle to the correct implementation of the plan is the Member States themselves. On the one hand, the political color of the governments and parliamentary arithmetic mean that there is no homogeneous discourse on defense and that not everyone is in a hurry or capable of applying the agreed measures. On the other hand, sometimes national interests take precedence over European ones (buying from a national company over another that is cheaper or more efficient; opting for a specific technology because it is produced in a specific country, etc.). The Commission is aware, and that is why the package includes: 1) implementation deadlines and 2) voluntary participation in projects (not all countries have to participate in all of them). In fact, the German Minister of Defense and European Affairs, Boris Pistorius, announced on October 16 that Germany intends to assume leadership of the European Air Shield project (where the famous European Iron Dome that we are hearing about these days is located). Other countries are expected to take the lead in the rest of the flagship projects in an attempt by the Commission to send the message: we are moving forward, if not all of us, even if only a few.
In conclusion, it is an ambitious and well-oriented plan, covering the most urgent areas, but with slow deadlines and the question of whether the Member States will be able to execute it. It can be said that Europe is stepping up its game in terms of defense “to maintain peace”, the center of the European project, and to be credible in terms of deterrence vis-à-vis other actors. Of course, it kindly asks its enemies not to invade it until 2030: it will take a while to reach those target deterrent capabilities. Let's hope to reach that date alive and speaking Spanish, and not Russian.
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Gonzalo Arana
About the author:Gonzalo Arana is a director at Oliver Wyman, in the Government, Defense and Financial Services department. Gonzalo has an MSc in Economics and Finance from UNAV-IESE Business School, an MBA from INSEAD and an MC/MPA from the Harvard Kennedy School. In addition to his work at Oliver Wyman, he is currently a senior fellow at EsadeEcPol and until September 2025 a visiting researcher at the Harvard Growth Lab, where he researches sustainable growth.
